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We Believe It Right That They Threw Daniel Into The Lion's Den

One of the great Hebrew prophets was Daniel. He lived during the captivity of the Jews in Babylon in the fifth century before Christ. At that time Darius the Mede was king (522-486 B.C.) of the Median and Persian empire.

Under the circumstances that existed we believe it was the right thing to do to throw Daniel into the lion's den. If we had been a contemporary we would (once things had gone as far as they had) not have resisted throwing in Daniel despite his age, fine character and genuine and courageous devotion to his God.

Readers should note our qualifications, namely, *under the circumstances* and *once things had gone as far as they had.*

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Daniel, as counsellor and administrator for Darius, had become too powerful in the opinion of his fellow counsellors and administrators. As Daniel was not a corrupt politician nor corruptible, his jealous rivals decided to trap him. They had observed Daniel's habit of advertising his act of praying, first kneeling and then praying before an open window facing toward Jerusalem and his fatherland which he would not see again. And so they had a "law passed" that nobody could pray (ask for anything) from God or man for thirty days except from King Darius. They persuaded Darius to sign the law.

There can be no question that this was a legal statute for the people of the Medo-Persian empire of which Daniel was a subject and a public official. The law, according to many Calvinists, should have been obeyed, because the Apostle Paul says (Romans 13:1):

> Let every soul be in subjection to the higher powers: for there is no power but of God; and the *powers* that be are ordained of God. Therefore, he that resisteth the power withstandeth the ordinance of God: and they that withstand shall receive to themselves judgment.

Daniel, however, deliberately disobeyed the formal law of the Medo-Persian empire. He boldly advertised his disobedience by continuing to pray before his open window facing toward Jerusalem. Not only did Daniel disobey, but he flaunted his disobedience before everybody. Why did he not take a vacation in his prayers? Why did he not at least close his window? He could easily have made up the loss of prayers for thirty days by praying longer after the thirty days had passed. He knew very well that thirty days is not a long time (in the life of a man possibly more than seventy years old). If governments have a pipe line of proper power, direct from God according to the Divine Right of Kings, or direct from the people according to Rousseau's ideas of popular sovereignty, or from God according to the *apparent* answer to Lord's Day XXXIX of the Heidelberg Catechism of the Christian Reformed church, then Daniel was a sinner when he disobeyed the law of the Medes and Persians, which "changeth" and "altereth" not.

Daniel's personal self-excuse may have been that he was required to "obey God rather than men." But God had nowhere declared that Daniel should advertise his act of praying; nor to have an open window toward Jerusalem.

Let us for the moment make a traditional approach to the problem.

It is inescapable that there are two laws in Scripture which frequently clash, as if they were two automobiles each going 65 miles an hour which collide head on and whose occupants fly through the windshields. The one law is: "be in subjection to the higher powers . . . ordained of God"; the other rule is "obey God rather than men." (Of course, there is no conflict when the "higher powers," that is, governments, obey the commandments of God. That means that there are *good* governments.)

A conservative denomination as the Christian Reformed can continue its existence for almost 100 years and not have the clarity or firmness in all that time to amend one of its standards so that instead of saying a government must *always* be obeyed it would say that governments should be obeyed only when they do what is right. To this day it teaches that every citizen should (Heidelberg Catechism, Lord's Day XXXIX):

> . . . bear patiently with their [the government's] weaknesses and shortcomings, since it pleases God to govern us by their hand.

What was the matter with this man Daniel that he did not act accordingly, and stop his ostentatious praying? (The reader will understand that that is not our opinion because we do not believe we should obey governments rather than God. We advertise that we believe God should be obeyed rather than men. See the August and September, 1955, issues of PROGRESSIVE CALVINISM. We were merely expressing the first reaction of some Christians.)

We put a caption on this article, towit: "We Believe It Right That They Threw Daniel Into The Lion's Den." We are not, however, in any way pleased with the law that the Medes and Persians passed. Further, we do not criticize Daniel for continuing his habit of advertising his prayers. We consider Daniel to have been wholly within his rights and not at all obligated to "bear

patiently with their [the government's] weaknesses and shortcomings, since it pleases God to govern us by their hand." Those are *not* the reasons why we are pleased that they shoved an old man over the edge of the lion's pit to his expected doom.

But once Daniel had involved himself as he was involved we would not have hindered those who pushed him in. This needs some explanation, and gives us an opportunity to make a vital point.

Darius must in many ways have been an admirable man:

1. Darius had the ability to choose between capable and stupid men. He picked Daniel promptly as his top assistant. And there can be no doubt that Daniel was a right smart man. Stupid men do not choose smart men. The stupid employer suffers from an inferiority complex if he has an employee who is abler. He does not want an abler man around.

2. Darius immediately realized that he had been trapped into signing a bad law. Scripture (Daniel 6:12-18) tells the story as follows (our capitals):

> Then they [the other jealous and malevolent counsellors and administrators] came near, and spake before the king concerning the king's decree: Hast thou not signed a decree, that every man that shall make petition unto any God or man within thirty days, save unto thee, O king, shall be cast in the den of lions? The king answered and said, The thing is true, according to the law of the Medes and Persians, WHICH ALTERETH NOT. Then answered they and said before the king, That Daniel who is of the children of the captivity of Judah, regardeth not thee, O king, nor the decree that thou has signed, but maketh his petition three times a day. Then the king, when he heard these words, was sore displeased, and set his heart on Daniel to deliver him; and he labored till the going down of the sun to rescue him. Then these men assembled together unto the king, and said unto the king, Know, O King, that it is a law of the Medes and Persians, that NO DECREE NOR STATUTE WHICH THE KING ESTABLISHETH MAY BE CHANGED.

> Then the king commanded, and they brought Daniel, and cast him into the den of lions. *Now* the king spake and said unto Daniel, Thy God whom thou servest continually, he will deliver thee. And a stone was brought, and laid upon the mouth of the den; and the king sealed it with his own signet, and with the signet of his lords; THAT NOTHING MIGHT BE CHANGED CONCERNING DANIEL. Then the king went to his palace, and passed the night fasting; neither were instruments of music brought before him: and his sleep fled from him.

3. Note, too, Darius' attempt to save Daniel. Darius had a sense of justice and he had courage. Nor was he unfeeling. He could not sleep that night.

Withal, Darius was undoubtedly a very worthwhile person. He was not craven nor contemptible. He did not desert a good man because it would have been politic to do so. He was neither an opportunist nor a coward. He had undoubtedly risen to the top of the heap because he was a *man.*

Nevertheless, in this affair Darius was piling mistake on mistake. He should never have signed the decree against prayer. Secondly, he should not have tried to violate the *constitution* of the Medes and Persians. By *constitution* we mean the super-law that they had to which Darius refers and to which his counsellors refer, namely, the great law that once a law of the Medes and Persians had been signed by the king *that everybody was then under the law even the king himself.* That law we consider a tremendous principle because it makes in this respect all men "neighbors" and treats them *equally,* which is absolutely essential to the law of brotherly love.

But the minute Darius discovered that his brilliant and influential favorite, Daniel, was in trouble, he set out to evade the basic constitution of the Medes and Persians, namely, the prohibition that a law could not be "altered" so that it would apply to one person but not to another person. The constitution required that the law was to be universal — *UNALTERABLE.* Hear the nobles haughtily challenging the king:

> Know, O king, that it is a law of the Medes and Persians, that no decree nor statute which the king establisheth may be changed.

We hold that it was more important that Daniel be cast into the lion's den and the *constitution* (the basic law) of the Medes and Persians be honored, than that the constitution be violated and *an exception be made for Daniel.*

That *constitutional law* of the Medes and Persians was a great law. It was a law to defend liberty and to restrict injustice, by preventing the persecution of enemies by making the law apply to them but favoring friends by relieving them from obedience to the law.

When a law was passed by the Medes and Persians those who passed the law knew that the law would apply to themselves as well as to all others. There were to be no exceptions. The natural consequence of that was that the legislators would not ordinarily pass a law which might hurt themselves. Except in unusual cases, as this law against praying during thirty days which trapped Daniel, the basic law was an excellent law:

1. It contributed toward care and honesty in making laws.
2. It made all men equal before the law.
3. It made it difficult to discriminate against *A* and to favor *B*.

It is regrettable that laws must sometimes prove to be harsh as in this case of Daniel. The natural tendency is to wish to avoid harshness by making exceptions to the law. That is what Darius was trying to do — to favor Daniel. There is no record that he tried to save anybody else who was entrapped by this thirty-day law against prayer.* Darius was trying to save a personal favorite.

It is much better that the law be universally applied even when it operates harshly than that the law be variably applied. To apply the law universally is a basic safeguard of liberty; to apply the law variably is to introduce eventual inevitable tyranny. Harshness

*The law in this case was practically a Bill of Attainder, a law passed against one man.

of the law and even injustice in the law are to be preferred to variability of the law.

One reason why the Medes and Persians were a great people is because they had a *constitutional* law, towit: laws applied *equally* to everybody and that not even their king could change that.

The *only* reason why we are reconciled to casting Daniel in the lion's den is because the basic law of the Medes and Persians defending liberty was far more important than the life of one old man, although he was a great and good man.

For a fuller understanding of this see the later article in this issue entitled, "The Quest For Ramparts For Liberty" and continuations in later issues.

Challenging Prevailing Ideas On Brotherly Love, On Obedience to Government, And On Justice

In the first issue of PROGRESSIVE CALVINISM we restricted our field by declaring that we were concentrating only on the Second Table of the Law, on the relations of men to men, as controlled by the great law of brotherly love, namely, thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself. It is essentially out of our field to concern ourselves with the First Table of the Law. We have more than enough to do in the limited field we have selected.

We are now far enough along in the first year of our publication of PROGRESSIVE CALVINISM to realize that we are presently aiming to do three things:

1. Discredit a sanctimonious and hyprocritical definition of the law of brotherly love, and substitute for it the simple and practical Biblical law of brotherly love. See the February, March, April and May issues of PROGRESSIVE CALVINISM for preliminary treatment. (We are by no means finished with the analysis.)

2. Discredit a confused vacillation among Christians about the doctrine when to obey a government and when to disobey. There are two rules in Scripture and *as practically always interpreted* they face in two directions and are antinomies (*an tin' o mies,* that is, contradictions). The two rules are "obey the powers that be," that is, whoever the government is, and "obey God rather than men." The churches generally live by the former commandment and by exception live by the latter. (It is so much easier!) We consider the church no longer a "salting salt" as long as it permits *in practice* obedience to men to take precedence over obedience to God. Respect for the church falls low when Christians prattle about "obeying the powers that be" when those powers are evil. (We are in this issue beginning our third instalment on this subject of the relation of men to government, that is, the instalment on the subject of political liberty.)

3. Discredit the present definition of the Christian churches on what is justice. We plan to show that what some leaders in orthodox churches teach about justice is in contradiction with what Scripture teaches about justice. Probably major space will be devoted to this subject of justice in the November and December issues. But we cannot now be sure what our space problems will permit.

Readers will become aware (1) that we consider orthodox churches to be intellectually confused on these questions; (2) that the fallacious ideas which are current on brotherly love, on the authority of government, and on justice are subversive to a good society; and (3) that real leadership by the church in practical moral matters will be dependent on the church shaking off its intellectual lethargy on ethical and social problems, abandoning sanctimony, and courageously telling the world ideas which are unpopular.

The orthodox Christian churches are full of error on practical questions. Progress will consist in getting rid of pious errors regarding brotherly love, liberty, and justice. Eventually our readers will understand what we mean by *progressive* Calvinism.

We are informed, as others are, that membership records of the churches are "favorable." Such records are of little significance. Churches admit members on the basis of (1) a vague declaration

regarding belief, (2) occasional attendance, and (3) some payment of contributions. But travel the world and what do you learn? This: there is little real interest in the church or its teaching; insignificant conformity to its rules; no expectation of discipline or respect for it; no improvement expected in the conduct of new members — bold profanity, nonobservance of the Sabbath, irregularity, use of coercion and fraud whenever those means are considered fruitful; and unconcealed and uninhibited covetousness.

Membership increases due to the biological factor of increased births or a payment to a church budget (a tax deductible item) are of small significance.

The churches (with a few exceptions) are steadily losing real ground. They deserve the consequences of their teachings. It is to be expected that more ground will be lost..

There are some church formalities left — christening, marriages and burial services. Beyond that the church means very little to many people. Why should it? Part of the message of the church is of a non-Christian origin. On such matters the label only remains Christian.

Could Eve Talk?

Adam was somewhere in Eden. Eve was brought to him. Could she talk already?

There has been a mortal dispute for many years between those who believe in creation and those who believe in evolution. There are some hard-to-believe aspects of both. The events are shrouded in the unknown and in some part in the apparent unknowable.

There is, we believe, some utility in endeavoring to reconstruct early events. Religious and nonreligious men have been working at it for thousands of years.

The creation account is about as abbreviated an account as any could be of an epochal event. Moses used less than fifteen

hundred words to describe creation. Undoubtedly his ignorance was great. He did not undertake to provide details.

We propose to ask some questions about creation. We are asking our first question.

It is clear from the account in Genesis that Eve could not sew. She had no clothes. Believing in a creation, we cannot hold that women have changed greatly. We cannot believe she would have appeared on the scene without some finery, if she could have woven fabric and sewn garments. It was, too, only a question of time, namely, change of the seasons, before she would urgently need some covering to keep warm.

It is equally probable that she could not cook. Despite her practical uselessness, Adam seems to have been glad to have her around, and she seems to have been glad to stay.

Moses makes it perfectly clear that Adam, despite his capabilities, was unshaven, was a stone-age man, and had had nobody with whom to talk. He was supposed to "dress" the trees in the Garden. His tools could have been nothing but pieces of stone — if he had those. He could not have had any metal knives, saws, hoes, sheers. His *stone* instruments could have hardly done him much good — assuming he had any. Probably the "dressing" consisted in breaking off twigs with his bare hands.

Things did not have names. Language depends on having names for things, that is, nouns. It was an *event* when Adam named the animals which would seem to have been part of the beginning of language. It would seem to be reasonable that neither Adam nor Eve could talk about animals (or anything) until they had names (nouns) for those real things. It appears, therefore, that Adam developed language. Did Adam learn to talk while he was alone? Is language learned? Would he have needed to learn to talk if Eve had never appeared?

There is no question that *later* Eve was able to talk; but could she talk *when she came to Adam?* Did she learn from Adam, or did they learn together how to talk? Was early talk much more than a system of grunts?

If there were subhuman ancestors in the evolutionary sense (which we do not believe) they could not (being subhuman) have taught Adam and Eve to talk.

And one more question: If Eve could not talk, how fast did she learn?

Theorists for evolution are working constantly on reconstructing the events of creation. Why not endeavor to reconstruct details according to the creation theory? It might be helpful for a sound view of the present world.

We Line Up With Sixteenth Century Dutch Calvinists Rather Than Modern Dutch Calvinists

Dr. Friedrich A. von Hayek, famous economist and author (well known to the public for his *The Road to Serfdom,* University of Chicago Press, a book which everyone should read), in one of his lectures this summer in Cairo under the auspices of the National Bank of Egypt, said (page 5, "The Political Ideal of the Rule of Law," 1955):

> In the modern world, general human liberty, as distinguished from the liberties that are the privileges of the few, hardly existed before the England of the seventeenth century.

But Hayek has a footnote to the foregoing. It reads:

> A fuller account of this development ought to give more attention to sixteenth and seventeenth century developments in Holland of which too little is known outside that country and of which I am largely ignorant. But I suspect that they had more direct influence on English thought than is commonly realized.

Those are kind words for Netherlanders of 300 years ago. We believe that development of more information will bear out Von Hayek's note.

Progressive Calvinism, as we make some attempt to advertise, has a Dutch background. The founders of the Progressive

Calvinism League are of Dutch stock. As such we have long realized that as American Calvinists we are more akin to the freedom-loving Calvinists in the Netherlands in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries than we are akin to the interventionist-minded twentieth-century Calvinists in the Netherlands.

Progressive Calvinism is *simpatico* with the freedom-loving patriots of the Low Countries (Catholic and Calvinist alike) in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, but we are unable to warm up to the wholly-different economic and political ideas of many of the present-day Dutch Calvinists, some of whose leaders are basically committed to government regulation and not to liberty.

That basic attitude on the part of Dutch Calvinists will be denied, and, of course, there are exceptions as, for example, the attitude of the group known as The Stichting Johannes Althusius (which takes its name from a man to whom Hayek refers). See July, 1955, issue of Progressive Calvinism, page 204. But the mass of Dutch Calvinists today appears to have a different (and deteriorated) social, political and economic philosophy from what their forebears had three or four centuries ago.

Groen van Prinsterer, whose heart in matters pertaining to liberty was in the right place, correctly ascribes much of the sixteenth and seventeenth century greatness of the Netherlands to the great principles of liberty, firmly believed in by Netherlanders at that time. Groen also correctly ascribed the decline of the significance of the Netherlands in large part to the loss of devotion to those principles.

We salute our great sixteenth and seventeenth century forebears.

The Quest For Ramparts For Liberty

Because there will be references to two earlier articles on the general subject of liberty, readers are advised to read those articles first. One article appeared in the August, 1955, issue of Progressive Calvinism, *page 218, under the title, "The Powers That Be Are Ordained of*

God," and the other appeared in the September, 1955, issue, page 251, under the title, "We Must Obey God Rather Than Men."

In actual history, governments do not always act according to the commandments of God. When governments require citizens to act contrary to the commandments of God or treat citizens contrary to such commandments, a grave practical problem arises. Generally, the churches have engaged in two pretenses, namely, (1) the pretense that there is very little conflict between the commandments of God and of a government, whereas in fact there is a conflict; and (2) the pretense that men must be obeyed rather than God, because "the powers that be are ordained of God." The fiction is that only on rare occasions does a government violate the commandments of God, and then a citizen has the duty of "bearing patiently with the weaknesses and shortcomings" of government. Possibly — so the position of Christians seems to be — under the most exceptional circumstances it may be necessary to "obey God rather than men." But for an ordinary Christian such a situation is so unusual a circumstance that it really lacks, in our enlightened age, any practical importance. That seems to be the view of many Christians.

Honest and clear-headed men of the world have looked at the situation differently. There is the well-known statement that "eternal vigilance is the price of liberty." The words "eternal vigilance" mean something different from "bearing patiently with the weaknesses and shortcomings" of government.

Readers will understand that we believe in "eternal vigilance" and that for us the controlling rule is, obey God rather than men. *For us that is the "categorical imperative," the universal, binding-on-all rule.*

* * *

In what follows there will be nothing new in regard to the principles of liberty. The basic ideas about liberty,

although lost to most of this generation of Calvinists, are old and well-known. What follows is really only a restatement of basic principles in a form designed to rebut false principles advanced in the name of religion, specifically in the name of modern so-called Calvinism. The great treatises on liberty will do a far better job in defense of liberty than this presentation which is really only an argumentum ad hominem, *that is, an argument directed to certain people, and intended at least to be valid for them even though the argument is not considered to be valid by others to whom it is not addressed. It is admitted that this argument for liberty is based on the Hebrew-Christian Scriptures, a foundation which many men do not accept as authoritative or even reliable. The argument here for liberty is not primarily a* rational *argument but an* authoritative *argument. For the full argument for liberty readers are referred to the classics.*

To avoid as much as possible difficulty in reading this article an anecdotal, rambling style has been adopted.

The broad subdivisions of this little attempt to promote liberty are two; they are:

I. The Mechanics of Liberty, and

II. The Substance of Liberty

By "mechanics of liberty" we refer to the devices and practical institutions men have developed to safeguard liberty. By "substance of liberty" we refer to the field of activity in which freedom may not be restrained against *A* by *B* or by a combination of men as *B, C, D, E* and *F*.

I. THE MECHANICS OF LIBERTY

What is Necessary for a Government to be Legitimate

Benito Mussolini, whose economic ideas were basically the same as those of John L. Lewis and of Abraham Kuyper (they all have favored syndicalism; see June, 1955, issue of PROGRESSIVE CALVINISM, pages 170-172), while dictator of Italy in the 1930s

became displeased with a historian who fled to Switzerland, Guglielmo Ferrero. As Benito was quite an athlete and very vain about his physical skills, he apparently decided he could get rid of Ferrero by challenging him to a duel; a good duel and there would be no Ferrero left to trouble Benito.

It is possible that under ordinary circumstances Ferrero might have accepted the challenge. I have no knowledge whether he was a good pistol-shot, or a good swordsman. But Ferrero declined the challenge. The reason was that Mussolini had specified that the duel was to be fought *in Italy*. Ferrero, considering, I suppose, that he would be running more than one risk if he went to fight the duel, was a very prudent man when he declined the challenge. Had he accepted it, he would have run at least three risks:

1. He might have been arrested, tried and executed by Mussolini's government before a duel could have taken place; or assassinated;

2. He might have lost the duel itself; or

3. He might, if he had defeated Mussolini, have been arrested after the duel and then have been tried and executed.

And so there was no duel between Mussolini and Ferrero.

In 1941 Ferrero had already written eleven or more books. He was at that time engaged in writing a trilogy (a series of three books in the field of history). The first has the French title, *Aventure, Bonaparte en Italie, 1796-97,* which was translated into English under the title, *The Gamble.* The second has the title, *The Reconstruction of Europe,* with the subtitle, *Talleyrand and the Congress of Vienna, 1814-15* (G. P. Putnam's Sons, New York, 1941). (The third book was to have a French title, *Pouvoir,* which is the French for *power.* We do not know whether it was published.) We shall in what follows restrict ourselves to what Ferrero writes in the second book, *The Reconstruction of Europe,* a book concerned with how order was established in Europe after the chaos caused by the French Revolution and Napoleon. The well-

known American columnist and author, Walter Lippmann, in March, 1941, made this comment about the book: "I consider it by far the most useful book that has been published since the war began: in no other have I found so much enlightenment as to how this war can eventually be brought to a conclusion." Although we differ radically from Lippmann on many matters, we concur that Ferrero's book is very helpful. We recommend it to those interested in the kind of subject covered by this book.

In *The Reconstruction of Europe* Ferrero declared that after World War II Europe would have to be reconstructed as it had to be reconstructed in 1815 after the Napoleonic wars. Ferrero believed the Congress of Vienna did a good piece of work. He declared it was good enough to give Europe 100 years of peace. And, strangely, the hero of the book is a Frenchman, Talleyrand, who is popularly considered to have been a calloused statesman and diplomat.

Ferrero published the book in 1941. Four years later World War II ended. Mussolini who had challenged Ferrero was dead. The American newspapers showed Mussolini's body hanging upside down, ludicrously, like old-fashioned, long underwear on a clothesline. Hitler, too, was dead. As Ferrero had foreseen, the problem of reconstructing Europe after Mussolini and Hitler was in 1945 as necessary as the same problem had been 130 years earlier after Napoleon. And Ferrero declares: here are the basic principles that must be observed or there will be no real "reconstruction."

The interesting question is: did the men who made the peace after 1945 follow as sound principles as those who made the peace in 1815? Whether Ferrero was still alive in 1945 or is still alive, we do not know. But we are sure that among the negotiators of the peace of 1945 there was not one who had such a sound view of government and of legitimate power as Talleyrand had in 1815.

We propose to summarize Ferrero's book briefly.

A

Ferrero first asks: Why did the leaders of the French Revolution and later Napoleon attack all the other nations of Europe

and fight with everybody, putting all Europe through a horrible blood-bath. Why? Ferrero's answer is that they were *afraid*. It is *fear,* according to Ferrero, and not primarily lust for power, which motivated the excesses of the French Revolution and of Napoleon. The Revolutionists and Napoleon were afraid of something and of somebody, and so they attacked. They did not wait to be attacked; they were too apprehensive. They were afraid because they were evil, namely, employing violence (in violation of the Sixth Commandment). They were eventually afraid of the effects of their own use of force. They fought because they were at heart filled with terror.

Someone may ask: What has that to do with what the Hebrew-Christian Scriptures say about liberty; I thought you were planning to advance an argument for liberty which would be accepted by Christians because it was a Biblical proposition. Our answer is that we are not unhinged from Scripture at all. Ferrero is only saying what Solomon said almost three thousand years ago: "The wicked fleeth when no man pursueth, but the righteous are bold as a lion" (Proverbs 28:1). The inevitable "price tag" attached to the doing of evil is an evil conscience and as a result subjective *fear*. Only doing what is right gives an easy conscience, and real courage, and eliminates the impulsion to further violence and coercion. Wherever there is evil, there will be fear; and wherever there is fear, there will be coercion; and wherever there is coercion, the Sixth Commandment in the Decalogue is violated (the commandment against killing and violence generally). (See Ferrero's book, Chapter I, entitled, "The Great Panic.")

B

The hero of Ferrero's book is Talleyrand. His full name was Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord. (Born in 1754 into an ancient and illustrious family. Lame. Unsuited for war and so destined by his family for the Church, against his wishes. Became priest and abbé at Périgord. Led a scandalous life. His mother would not see him anymore. His father, on deathbed, asked king to make young Talleyrand a bishop. Made bishop at 34. Elected to the French States General (parliament). Went along with French Revolution as a renegade nobleman-churchman. Introduced bill stripping Church of its properties. When 37 years old resigned his

ecclessiastical connections. Fled from Revolution to England and then to the United States. At age of 41 (in 1795) returned to France and through the influence of Madame De Stäel became Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Revolution. Participated in the events of 18 Brumaire establishing the so-called Counterrevolution. At age of 48 married pretty divorced woman 40 years old who had been his mistress for four years. Served Napoleon in creation of his empire. Alone knew the key to the only way to establish a good peace after the Napoleonic Wars. Nobleman, churchman, libertine, opportunist, and generally hated and feared, but withal a great man who understood better (we believe) what the Christian religion teaches than many who profess it and who lead exemplary lives.)

It will do little good to endeavor to defend that part of his conduct which was evil, and we shall not attempt it. But it can be "explained." The three main charges against him are (1) his hostility to the church; (he is said to have rebelled against it because his family had *forced* him to become a priest); (2) his immorality; (history tells us of many men who are steadfast in adversity, do not waver under great trials, never lose control of their emotions, but are guided by imperturbable good judgment — except they are not proof against a woman); (3) his service as an opportunist and eventual renegade first to the Church and the Old Order in France, then to the Revolution, then to the Counterrevolution, and then to the Napoleonic Empire; how could a man, except he be a conscienceless one, serve in succession such a series of irreconcilable programs to all of which he was in some degree opposed? (We have observed that the wisest among men do not quickly resign and withdraw from major events, but stay on because they are often more able to do what should be done by continuing than by withdrawing. Such men are willing to pay the price, namely, be tarred with the reputation of being a hypocrite. Talleyrand was one of the most hated and despised men of his day.)

Let us look beyond the man's personal faults and see what was good about his ideas.

C

The principles involved in the relationships of men to governments were in a fiery crucible during Talleyrand's life, as they

would have to be in the life of any man prominent in the last days of the Old Regime in France, the Revolution, the Counterrevolution, the Napoleonic Empire, and in the peace that followed. Talleyrand not only lived during that time, and he was not only a participant, but he was in some respects the greatest European thinker on the questions involved.

First, it should be mentioned that he was a product of genuinely *pre*-Revolution thinking. He had adopted the ideas about the "law of nations" which were developed in the eighteenth century (before the time of the theorists of the Revolution). Talleyrand never subscribed to the basic premises of the Revolution. He began with the same premises as did a great Netherlander (whom we have mentioned in earlier issues), namely, Guillaume Groen van Prinsterer. On many fundamental problems of right and wrong, of the relations of men to men, and of men to government Groen and Talleyrand were agreed. We proceed to summarize Talleyrand's ideas.

D

Talleyrand, according to Ferrero, was in basic revolt against the ideas of the Revolution and of Napoleon. Ferrero calls the principle underlying the Revolution and the Napoleonic Empire, the principle of *adventure;* Talleyrand had called it the principle of *enterprise.* By those terms Ferrero and Talleyrand meant the same thing, namely, the principle of the use by government of *force,* of *coercion,* of *violence.* Over against that principle Talleyrand represented, according to Ferrero, the principle of the *constructive mind,* the principle that is *opposed to force, opposed to coercion, opposed to violence.*

On that we believe Talleyrand to have been wholly right. Here are extracts of what he wrote in his famous *Memoir* when he was in England as a refugee from the Revolution; he was then 38 years old; (our italics):

> "True pre-eminence, the only one both useful and rational, the only one worthy of free and enlightened men, consists in being master in one's own house, and never in possessing the *ridiculous ambition for mastery over others";* that "all territorial aggrandizement, all those

> *usurpations by means of force and cunning* which an old and illustrious tradition had concealed under the names of *rank,* of *consistency of policy,* of superiority in the order of powers, are naught but cruel games of political folly, untrue estimates of power, whose real effect is to increase the expenses and difficulties of the administration and to diminish the happiness and safety of the people in favor of the fugitive interest or the vanity of those who govern." (Page 19.)

Ferrero interprets Talleyrand's idea in his own (Ferrero's) words, towit: "All thoughts of aggrandizement by the Old Regime must be abandoned. France must remain within her natural boundaries and make no alliances with any great power. He declared an alliance is rational and just only when it is limited to a *reciprocal defense act.*"

Let us convert Talleyrand's ideas into Biblical language.

1. The policy of "adventure," that is, appeal to *force, coercion* and *violence* is destructive, and contrary to the Sixth Commandment in the Decalogue, namely, thou shalt not kill, which obviously in a broad sense is a commandment forbidding coercion and violence.

2. The proper use of *force* is severely restricted, namely, to self-defense. This is what Moses taught long ago, towit, you can do what you will in your relations toward other men *except you may not harm them by coercion, adultery, fraud, theft.* (See March, 1955, issue of Progressive Calvinism.) The use of violence, for Talleyrand, could not properly go beyond self-defense. In that regard he was merely following Moses. Talleyrand called it a ridiculous ambition to strive "for mastery over others."

3. What holds for men as individuals holds for governments (men collectively). The moral law of God applies to *all* phases of life, not merely to men individually. Governments may not make alliances except for "reciprocal *defense.*"

4. Governments are not naturally good. They frequently use force and cunning. And what is pretended to be for the public good is really for the "fugitive interest or the vanity of

those who govern." Here is a realistic statement of the "total depravity" of man. Everyone is tempted to do what is wicked, *rulers* as well as those who are ruled. A *naturally* beneficent government is a fiction, and men will not establish liberty by leaving the defense of liberty to the government.

When after victories by the armies of the Revolution the Treaty of Campo Formio was signed, Talleyrand wrote the following to the Directory, the body which was then the administrative head of France (our italics):

> . . . the Treaty of Campo Formio and every other treaty we have signed are nothing but military capitulations by the enemy of little permanent worth. The rivalry, momentarily subdued by the amazement and consternation of the loser, is not of a nature to be definitely ended by *force of arms, which is transitory, whereas hatred lives on.* (Page 22.)

Hear how the renegade nobleman-churchman expresses in his own words the same idea that Scripture teaches; he says: "force . . . is transitory, whereas hatred lives on." Talleyrand was telling the Directory in its hour of triumph that its program was wrong and would eventually come to grief. Away with force, and do away with the causes of hatred! Does modern Calvinism teach equally clearly what Scripture teaches? Of course not. Today the leaders in orthodox Calvinist denominations do not criticize the use of force, but say it "has not been proven from Scripture to be sin" to use coercion. And how can liberty exist when general coercion is an admitted principle?

E

To Napoleon in his hour of triumph Talleyrand in remonstrance wrote as follows (our italics):

> Sire, three centuries of civilization have bequeathed to Europe a law of nations for which, in the words of a famous writer, human nature will never be grateful enough. This law is founded on the principle that *nations should in time of peace do each other the most good, and in time of war the least possible harm.*

Talleyrand refers to the Law of Nations. And he states the law admirably: Do to your neighbor the most good and even in disputes the least possible harm. He ascribed Europe's greatness to this Law of Nations, and he was probably right. The tribes in central Africa have observed no Law of Nations but have devoted much of their time to mutual extermination.

What is this Law of Nations? It is nothing more than what the Hebrew-Christian Scriptures teach as being the law of brotherly love. The Law of Nations is a practical application of the law of brotherly love to international affairs.

Ferrero discounts the idea that the Law of Nations was a specific set of rules. Instead he indicates it was a distinct "approach" or attitude toward justice and peace in international affairs. The Law of Nations consisted of wise and humane general rules which had the purpose of restricting the use of coercion and violence between states. Ferrero declares that appeal to coercion and use of force in international affairs does more harm to the aggressor than to the victim. He alleges that that is exactly what the outcome of the aggression of the French Revolution substantiated.

The Law of Nations did not envisage that its laws would be imposed by force. To the contrary, a fundamental concept was that statesmen should be wise enough to accept those laws voluntarily, and that in doing so they would not only be working for the welfare of their own country but for the welfare of other countries and of all mankind.

The Law of Nations warned statesmen against hatred, vengeance, cruelty, fraud, theft, covetousness in either war or peace. What is this other than a return to the elementary ideas of the Second Table of the Law?

We are reminded of what Grotius in his *Law of War and Peace* wrote (Peace Book Company, London, 1939):

> The saying of Tacitus is very applicable in regard to the use of victory: "Excellent are the conclusions of those wars where pardons are the characteristic of the final terms." And . . . there is the letter of the dictator Caesar:

> "Let this be a new way of conquering: to protect ourselves by mercy and generosity." (Page 81.)

And Grotius also quotes Sallust as saying that the ancient Romans followed this principle:

> Our ancestors, most religious of men, took nothing from the vanquished except liberty to do wrong. (Page 79.)

No workable Law of Nations will ever be anything else than the application of the Second Table of the Decalogue. The Law of Nations is not unhinged from scriptural morality. Morality, in contradiction to what the Hebrew-Christian Scriptures teach (correctly understood), simply does not exist.

The Law of Nations, as does the Law of God, has, of course, a *rational* foundation. Ferrero puts it plainly: "abuses of force in relations between states . . . *do more harm to the states committing them than to those upon whom they are committeed* — as the Revolution had just proved."

Moses said the same thing when he warned, "Your sins will find you out."

F

We come to the question regarding what is necessary for a government to be legitimate. To this question neither Talleyrand nor Ferrero gives the answer that a government is legitimate merely because it possesses power. Both men carefully avoid the proposition that the existence of power, the ability to coerce, is proof that a government is "ordained of God," which is the proposition often foolishly and erroneously deduced from a statement of the Apostle Paul in Romans 13.

In the preface of his book Ferrero summarizes the purpose of his book and its principle proposition.

The purpose of his book is to show that the basic idea of Talleyrand in 1815 is the same basic idea to which the world would be obliged to conform at the end of World War II, if real peace was to be established after that war, caused as it was by the usurpations of Lenin-Stalin, of Mussolini and of Hitler.

Ferrero says regarding World War II that the cause of the war was to be found in the internal structure of several of the principal European states. Those states had become "revolutionary" states, that is, they were states based on *force* and *coercion* and *violence*. Those states did not permit "opposition." They did not have really "free elections." To Ferrero and to Talleyrand (whose thinking Ferrero is tracing and admiring) the resulting governments lacked "legitimacy." They were not valid governments. They were "usurpations." Because they were usurpations they were unstable. Because they were unstable they were beset by "fears," the fears common to all men whose consciences are ill at ease. The use of coercion by such governments (usurpations) breeds more coercion. Every evil deed arouses a new frenzy of fear, which the usurpation believes can be warded off only by a new use of force, namely, a new attack on citizens within or a new attack on neighbors around.

According to Ferrero's thesis, Stalin, Hitler and Mussolini (remember Ferrero was a refugee from Mussolini's Italy) could not keep the peace any more than Napoleon a hundred and forty years earlier could keep the peace. Nor could peace be restored, nor would it be permanent, unless the principle underlying all usurpations (the principle of coercion and force and violence) was repudiated, and instead of having usurpations or revolutionary states, there would be instead "legitimate" governments.

The question is: what makes a government legitimate? To this question Talleyrand by his own solitary thinking had found an answer which Ferrero considers to be the right answer.

For a state to be legitimate (and consequently stable and peaceful and not bedeviled by fear), it must be based on a principle that is wholly sound. That principle is that the "right of opposition" must be respected. As a supplementary principle, not separable in this age from the principle just mentioned, there must be "free elections." These two inseparable principles — the right of opposition and free elections — are the foundations on which today governments in the Western World must be founded in order to be "legitimate."

It is true that "elections" were permitted in Mussolini's Italy, and Hitler's Germany and there are from time to time elections in

Russia and its satellites. But these are not free elections. In Russia there is only one list of candidates. And even if there were more than one set of candidates, the modern usurpatory, illegitimate governments do not permit free elections in the sense that a voter can *without fear* go to the polls and vote for the party not in power.

The principles of free elections and of the right of opposition assume that there is a majority and a minority. The majority has the right to govern, but the minority has the right to its own opinion, and the right to express it, and to obtain converts for it, and to vote for it. The minority must feel it has the liberty to work to become the accepted majority. The present (1955) surviving Revolutionary governments (those behind the Iron Curtain and associated with Russia, and other governments as the recent Peron government in the Argentine) make a farce of free elections.

It is because the right of opposition (and in this age, the right of free elections) is so universally recognized as a requirement for a government if it wishes to be considered legitimate that the revolutionary states are very solicitous about employing the pretense of free elections in order to be able to declare (although it is false) that they *represent* their people. Russia and its satellites and China and Peron's Argentine all call themselves *people's* democracies or some equivalent term.

Talleyrand noted that as Napoleon's empire was tottering people basically misunderstood what was wrong. Everybody was saying that they were fighting against a man, a usurper, a menace; they did not in the least understand that the issue was not a man but a principle — the issue of usurpation versus legitimacy of government. What Talleyrand observed could also be observed in Hitler's day and Mussolini's day, and can be observed in the United States even today in regard to Russia and its satellites. Men speak as if they were fighting a man, a Stalin or a Malenkov or a Khrushchev, whereas they should speak of fighting a system, a principle, namely, the principle of usurpation which is the principle of coercion.

Talleyrand, therefore, did not consider the Europe organized by Napoleon to be a Europe that could ever attain a stable peace.

The Napoleonic Europe was a Europe based on compulsion. To become stable and peaceful the principle of compulsion would have to be abandoned and in its place the old principle of legitimacy would have to be established, and the principle of legitimacy is the antonym — the exact opposite of the principle of compulsion — namely, it is the principle of noncoercion, of voluntarism, of persuasion, of freedom in elections, of the right to oppose. Deny the right of opposition and you have a usurpation and an illegitimate government.

It may be believed by some that on such a principle pre-Revolution France had an illegitimate government, and that therefore the old monarchy of France should not have been restored in 1815. But we refer readers to what we have previously written about Groen van Prinsterer in the September, 1955, issue of PROGRESSIVE CALVINISM. Groen van Prinsterer, we said, primarily opposed the French Revolution because it washed away the hard-won "liberties" and "privileges" which the people had obtained from their sovereigns. What was this other than Talleyrand's principle of the right of opposition. The possession of "rights" referred to by Groen was just another name for the right to oppose a government in the acquisition and defense of those rights. The "rights" were a specific form of the right of opposition. Groen and Talleyrand were in political philosophy close kinfolk. And they were both magnificently right on this main issue.

In his correspondence during 1815 Talleyrand referred to the idea that a government might be legitimate because it was from God. He declared that in earlier times religious sentiments were strong enough and exerted enough influence so that it was easy for the people to believe that the sovereign power came from above. But Talleyrand, ex-priest and ex-bishop, declared that so little religiosity remained, that religious opinion regarding legitimacy of the government was no longer able to sustain a government on the ground that it had a divine origin (or, in our language, a pipe line of power from the throne of God).

But if people were no longer able to respect a government because they no longer believed it was a government with a divine origin in that sense, what, Talleyrand asked, was necessary in order that the people would respect the government. His answer was

worthy of a churchman. He answered: "It must indispensably be so constituted that people will have no cause to fear it in any way," that is, it would not be a dangerous, or menacing, or unjust, or tyrannical government. The Apostle Paul described exactly the same kind of government as Talleyrand described, although Paul uses different words. We quote from Romans 13:3: "For rulers are not a terror to the good work, but to the evil. And wouldst thou have no fear of the power? Do that which is good, and thou shalt have praise from the same." This is exactly the kind of government to which Talleyrand refers, namely, a legitimate government.

Talleyrand was a rationalist as well as a man educated in the principles of the church (although no longer within the church nor faithful to it). He gives his reason why a government should not terrorize its citizens. He declared that it was as much to the interest of the sovereign as to that of the subject that the power be so constituted as to cause no fear to a citizen conducting himself properly. A government whose citizens fear it if they do wrong is a good government; a government whose citizens fear it if they do what is right is a bad government. (Regarding what is "right" and "wrong" see later issues of PROGRESSIVE CALVINISM where the *substance* of liberty is being considered.)

We do consider Talleyrand to have been wrong on one item. He indicates that the doctrine of the "divine right" of government is a Christian doctrine. That has indeed been the actual *history* of the attitude of the church. That is still the medieval idea of the Christian Reformed church. But the two ideas are not logically related nor scripturally related; it is possible to interpret Scripture correctly and when that is done there is no silly allegation about the "divine right" of government in itself (*per se*), but only a derived legitimacy of a government obtained by obedience to the Second Table of the Law. That is the good government to which Talleyrand referred — a government so constituted that people will have no cause to fear it in any way (except the people engage in evil).

Eventually, through Talleyrand's efforts, Louis XVIII was restored to the throne of France. Talleyrand was no fearful courtier, but instead expressed his ideas plainly to the new king. In

effect he said: You are the king; you are the lawful king; but you are not infallible; you have no pipe line directly from God; there previously were ancient rights and privileges which protected your subjects (shades of Groen van Prinsterer!); but many of these have been swept away by the tidal wave of the French Revolution; there is now only one way to govern to protect the people; and that way is to surround yourself with *representative* institutions which have incorporated in them the right of opposition, which is guaranteed by the fact that there are really free elections. Free elections plus the right of opposition plus a government protecting the rights of citizens will give a kingdom (or any government) a legitimate title to the exercise of government. Talleyrand added that the Revolution should have given the right of opposition to the people in France (as a substitute for their ancient privileges) but that the Revolution had failed to do that. Talleyrand said: It is now up to you as the new sovereign to do what the Revolution failed to do.

Those are plain and honorable words.

Let us now ask ourselves: *what makes a government legitimate, and worthy to be obeyed?*

Is it *power* as if there were a pipe line from God? No.

Is it *power* by the strength of victory and terror and usurpation? No.

Is it *power* in any threatening sense at all? No.

Is it *power* in the sense that a majority can coerce a minority? No.

Instead, a government is *legitimate if it permits opposition,* and opposition can be peaceful (that is permitted) only when there are free elections. Deny the right of opposition and you deny peaceful elections. Deny peaceful elections and a government can only be founded on *force.* Force is a violation of the Sixth Commandment, thou shalt not kill (or coerce), (except such force as is necessary to resist evil). A government to be legitimate must not *command* obedience; it must *earn* obedience. Such a government is based on voluntary submission by intelligent citizens. Such a government is based on the most ancient code of the Hebrews, a law declared in the Scriptures to be directly from God.

A legitimate government is not *directly* from God. A legitimate government, in so far as its policy regarding *power* is concerned, is *indirectly* from God. For a government to be legitimate *it must* conform to the Sixth Commandment. The legitimacy of a government stems *directly* only from the Sixth Commandment.

Of course, if might (power) makes right, if power gives authority, if there is a direct pipe line of power from God to some man or men, if governments are not themselves under the law of God — then it is possible to declare that *every* government must be obeyed, because it is "ordained of God." Then we merely confuse the matter when we say that we must "obey God rather than men."

All governments based on mere *power* are governments based on some kind of usurpation, namely, a usurpation alleged to be legitimate because it allegedly comes (1) from God or (2) from the people. But such a government cannot be from God unless it obeys the Sixth Commandment, and it cannot be from the people unless it permits free elections.

None of the present totalitarian governments is legitimate and none of them needs to be obeyed. (When and how to disobey is another matter and is a *practical* question.) They are all usurpations. They all violate the Sixth Commandment.

Exactly in proportion as the government of the United States extends its power beyond what the law of brotherly love permits (and it has made indefensible extensions) it may and should be disobeyed. Exactly in proportion as social institutions, as the labor unions, appeal to coercion in violation of the Sixth Commandment they are usurpatory and evil and should be resisted. (See July, 1955, issue of PROGRESSIVE CALVINISM, pages 178-195.)

Few of the churches throughout the world testify against these usurpations. They are confused and pusillanimous institutions.

Ferrero became a refugee in Switzerland. At the end of his book he tells a simple anecdote which is not erasable from my mind. Here it is:

In the Swiss city in which he had found refuge he occasionally saw a spectacle that appeared symbolic to him and impressed him deeply. The city had a two-party system, with, of course, periodic

political campaigns. Before election time both parties would be campaigning and there would be parades and processions by both parties, each going down the streets separately with their own bands and flags. Ferrero notes that the two groups were opposed to each other. They represented differences of opinion and rivalries. The two parties were not made up of angels without a fault, but of mortal men, anxious and excited and determined to win.

Nevertheless he observed that they marched in an orderly manner. A few policemen stood idly by doing nothing. They were not even armed nor were they unfriendly, although they belonged to one party or the other.

And how could it be kept peaceful? Ferrero declares that that was accomplished by having an understanding between them, namely, that they would settle their differences by persuasion and not by coercion, by voting and not by swords, by peaceful elections and not by civil war. It was agreed that the majority would have their way and have their representatives in office. A difference of one vote might determine who would be the majority. But they all were prepared to abide by that. And the minority would lose no personal rights and suffer no personal danger from having been unable to get enough votes to become the majority.

Ferrero calls the situation just described a convention; and a very fragile one, a convention or custom as easily wiped away as a web of silk threads. This convention or agreement Ferrero does not consider to be the convention of men who are afraid or timid or unprepared to fight. He considers this convention to be one representing the finest judgment, a convention which keeps men from falling upon each other in mortal and hateful combat.

For Ferrero it is one or the other — force or nonforce; persuasion or violence; if force is abandoned the policy must be one of peace and persuasion; if peace and persuasion are abandoned, the only alternative is coercion.

Ferrero has no illusions about man. He fully understands the violent passions to which mankind is subject. He also realizes that failure to restrain those passions — thereby permitting violence, adultery, theft and fraud — will cause the whole social order to come toppling down in ruin. Permit men to do wrong or permit a

government to do more than restrain what is wrong and you unleash fear and covetousness. Gone are peace and confidence and cooperation. In their stead are terror and violence. And the more men become afraid the more they resort to coercion. They no longer rely on a method which was characteristic of the famous Dutch prince, William the Silent, who accomplished most of his great deeds by use of "powerful reasons why" for doing what ought to be done.

In Ferrero's thinking the whole purpose of the right of opposition and of free elections was to maintain order without having recourse to violence. And being a philosopher he did not wish to have society regulated in every detail by formal laws made by the state, but in order to maintain order he wished a maximum reliance to be placed on

> moral, ritual and religious laws, laws of prudence and wisdom, which individuals and groups impose upon themselves without physical coercion, by means of a reciprocal moral pressure. In other words, silk threads rather than iron fetters. Self-discipline is the highest form of the constructive mind. A great civilization is merely a system in which the process of self-discipline has become more and more complex and refined.

The foregoing completes our basic thoughts on that phase of the "mechanics of liberty" which consists in determining the "legitimacy" of a government. Following Talleyrand and Ferrero our thought is: a government is legitimate when it acknowledges that it is a creature of men, and when it gives sincere evidence of that acknowledgment by operating in an atmosphere of unrestricted right to *opposition.* Note that we do not say a government is legitimate when it *grants* the right of opposition. The right of opposition is antecedent to the government and above the government and is not a grant from a government. Such a view of government and the legitimacy of government is a far cry from "bearing patiently with a government's weaknesses and shortcomings, since it pleases God to govern us by their hand," unless this is interpreted to mean that we are obligated to be patient in a noncoercive society, that is, that we are patient as a minority who may become a majority. We wholly reject the idea that we should be

"patient" about evil when the opportunity of opposition (persuasion and freedom) is denied.

If someone is apprehensive that we are neglecting to say that government is *from God,* our answer to that is that we fully agree that a government is from God, but our agreement means that we hold that there is no direct line from God to a government but *only an indirect line,* namely, the line *through the Decalogue.* For a government to be *from God* it must be based on the principle of noncoercion, that is, on agreement and not on force; it must be based on voluntarism and not on coercion; it must acknowledge the right to "oppose" peacefully and not only by rebellion, because if the right to peaceful opposition is denied the right to forceful opposition is always still more denied.

A government as well as men has the obligation to be *meek,* that is, *to avoid coercion on all matters,* except the restraint of overt evil. Such a government rests in a very special sense on the basic idea of the Sixth Commandment (Thou shalt not kill), which in the broadest possible sense forbids force, violence, coercion. A government itself eschewing coercion and prohibiting the use of coercion by individuals or groups of individuals is a government which may claim that it is "ordained of God." None other may do that. None other is based on Scripture. And none other is in accordance with the basic ideas of Christ in regard to meekness.

In our opinion all governments based on *coercion* (except to restrain overt evil) are anathema in the sight of God. And in our opinion all admonitions to obey such governments are admonitions in conflict with the "categorical imperative" for all Christians: "Obey God rather than men."

F.N.*

(*To be continued*)

*(All articles in this issue are by F. N.)

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